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A review of U. S. dairy policy from the early 1900s through the 1980s exposes the 
changing nature of regulation in dairy markets. While dairy policy was originally legislated 
to stabilize markets and increase milk prices at the farm level, its focus in the 1980s shifted 
to the apparently chronic problem of surplus dairy products. This report reexamines the 
events during the 1900s that led to federal and state regulation of the dairy industry and 
describes the progression of dairy policy from the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act through 
the 1990 Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act. 
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The Evolution of Milk Pricing and Government Intervention in Dairy Markets 
by Eric M. Erba and Andrew M. Novakovic 
Introduction 
The United States federal and state governments regulate many agricultural 
products, but none is more regulated than milk. The U. S. is not unusual in this respect; 
most governments in major milk-producing countries take an active role in the regulation of 
milk production and milk marketing. Prior to the Great Depression, federal and state 
governments were not directly involved in regulating the dairy industry. The economic 
collapse caused by the Depression led to the first piece of legislation that attempted to 
raise producer milk prices and stabilize the tumultuous market. Once involved in regulation 
of the dairy industry, political inertia effectively eliminated any possibility for a quick 
separation of the federal government from further commitments to the industry. This paper 
details the characteristics that led to governmental intervention, the manner and form of 
intervention throughout the past 60 years, and the impact of legislative attempts to direct 
and oversee the dairy industry. 
The Dairy Industry Prior to 1900 
Prior to the twentieth century, farming in the United States was widespread, and 
most people raised a high percentage of the food they consumed. In general, farms were 
not specialized. Changes in how food was produced and how farms evolved to become 
specialized operations occurred with the growth of large cities, e.g., Boston, New York, and 
Philadelphia. Large cities relied on nearby farms to provide a supply of food, and dairy 
farms, in particular, were quick to respond to population shifts as people moved from rural 
communities to urban centers. 
The railroad was, in part, responsible for the specialization of dairy farms. The 
railroad provided a means of shipping goods more quickly and to more distant locations. 
Railroads changed the profile of dairy farmers by moving milk from saturated local markets 
to large cities where both the demand and price for fluid milk was higher. .Dairy farmers 
recognized the opportunity for specialization afforded to them and began to concentrate on 
milk production. As the demand for fluid milk in the burgeoning cities increased, milk was 
shipped longer distances from more distant farms in order to meet the demands of 
population-dense areas. Dairy farmers transported milk to receiving stations in 40-quart 
cans, which were then placed on railroad cars and transported to processing plants located 
in the city. The introduction of refrigerated tanker cars in the late 1870s further increased 
the volume of milk shipments and the distance over which milk could be transported (8). 
As roads improved, trucks began to replace rail cars as the main means of 
transporting milk to processing plants. The introduction of trucks meant greater flexibility for 
the farmer in terms of when the milk could be shipped to plants or receiving stations and 
diminished the need for farmers to transport their milk by rail. However, for the largest 
cities, railroads continued to be the method of choice for bringing in milk from distances 
greater than about 80 miles from the city (8). 
1
 
Milk Distribution and Milk Cooperatives Prior to the 1920s 
The expansion of the fluid milk market led to specialized dairy farms, and milk 
handlers and dealers evolved to facilitate distribution of fluid milk products within the cities. 1 
Historically, farmers produced and distributed fluid milk as well as some manufactured 
products; these producer-distributors were the norm. As large cities developed and farmers 
faced greater demands for fluid milk and dairy products, the number of producer­
distributors declined. Dairymen became more involved in the production of milk and could 
not afford to expend time distributing their product. The distribution task became the 
responsibility of organizations specializing in milk processing and marketing. These firms 
bought, processed and distributed fluid milk and had the capacity to manufacture dairy 
products if surplus quantities of milk existed. Specialized processors grew to large sizes 
because of the economies of size in assembling and distributing milk, and thus, the milk 
produced by several dairy farmers was required to adequately supply a single processor. 
The pattern of milk buying that characterized this period was that of a few large, 
organized distributors with some degree of market power buying a perishable product from 
many small, unorganized producers. The producers had little influence in pricing decisions 
and were consequently suspicious of the prices, weights and tests performed by buyers. 
The inequality in bargaining power was the primary reason for producers organizing 
collective bargaining units. The producers wanted to "level the playing field" when 
bargaining with dealers and thought that such an organization could affect the price by 
controlling milk supplies. Milk handlers were opposed to these collective bargaining groups 
and viewed milk marketing cooperatives as illegal conspiracies in restraint of trade. 
Handlers also claimed that the cooperatives violated the intent of the Sherman Act of 
1890, which prohibited price fixing. The cooperatives, on the other hand, argued that the 
Clayton Act of 1914 permitted non-stock cooperatives to bargain collectively for prices 0 n 
behalf of their members (8). However, the Clayton Act did not address the vague wording 
of the Sherman Act, nor did it provide specific provisions detailing the circumstances under 
which cooperatives would be protected by the law. Hence, cooperatives were subject to 
legal action that challenged their existence. In 1922, the Capper-Volstead Act was passed 
and clarified the legal status of cooperative marketing associations. The Capper-Volstead 
Act essentially gave limited antitru st immunity to marketing cooperatives, and under the 
auspices of the Act, farmers were free to collude and participate in price-setting behavior. 
Pricing of Milk Prior to the 1920s 
No standard pricing procedures were in place for the pricing of fluid milk products, 
and experimentation with different schemes was not uncommon with innovations 
introduced by cooperatives and private firms. Producers realized that it was the milk 
dealers who controlled the level of milk pricing. Though producers attempted to band 
together in an effort to increase their bargaining power, dealers dominated price 
negotiations from the late 1800s to about 1916 (3, 4, 8). 
'A "handler" is any milk dealer who disposes of grade A fluid milk products. Handlers include fluid milk 
processors who distribute milk to consumers and retailers as well as persons who sell milk to other dealers for 
fluid milk distribution. The term "handler" applies to proprietary operations and cooperative associations that 
handle milk for their members. 
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Several problems were encountered when devising a milk pnclng plan. First, 
production of milk was variable from year to year, and within a single year, seasonal 
variations in level of milk production were likely to occur. Second, consumption of fluid milk 
also varied seasonally, but consumption patterns did not coincide with production patterns. 
Third, because milk was a perishable commodity, it could not be stored to balance out the 
seasonal differences in supply and demand for fluid milk. Fourth, in order for milk to be 
eligible for fluid use, stricter sanitary requirements had to be met on the farm which led to a 
significant increase in the cost of production. The additional cost of producing milk eligible 
for fluid use had to be returned to the farmer. In absence of an economic stimulus, there 
would be no incentive to upgrade the sanitary standards on the farm. The combination of 
these factors resulted in a number of approaches to pricing milk. Flat pricing, base excess, 
classified pricing, and base rating formed the foundation of the pricing strategies that 
emerged in the early 1900s. 
Flat pricing was a simple approach to the milk pricing question but had obvious flaws 
that became apparent upon implementation. Under this system, the price for all milk sold 
by a single farmer was the same, regardless of location of purchase or production, 
composition, or other quality factors. Though apparently impervious to concerns about 
equitable producer prices, the price received could vary from farmer to farmer depending 
on demand of handler. Fluid milk handlers had to offer a higher price than manufacturing 
plants to aUract milk and compensate farmers for the added expense of meeting higher 
sanitary requirements. However, flat pricing often compelled processors to add farmers in 
the short supply season and cut farmers during the flush, contributing to the instability of 
the dairy industry. Small processors generally used flat pricing because they did not 
bargain with cooperatives for milk. Large fluid processors, by virtue of the sheer volume of 
milk processed, usually dealt with cooperatives to obtain a supply of milk. As a result, 
these processors faced a different pricing scheme - usually the base excess plan or 
classified pricing scheme. 
The base excess plan established a base level of production according to milk 
deliveries during the short supply months. The base level was updated as often as every 
year. The farmers were paid fluid milk prices for this milk. Any milk in excess of the base 
received the manufacturing milk price. Base excess pricing was an improvement over flat 
pricing in terms of reducing instability, but price instability was not eliminated entirely 
because of seasonal fluctuations in production. The plan was also flawed in that 
neighboring farmers could receive vastly different milk prices which sparked criticism from 
groups concerned about equitable producer prices. 
Classified pricing came about from the marketing of a cooperative's milk, and more 
specifically, from the problem of "surplus" milk on a seasonal basis. 2 The three main 
objectives of classified pricing were to obtain higher returns for producers, to facilitate 
disposal of the milk in excess of the fluid milk requirements so that no instability was 
created in the fluid milk market by the presence of surplus milk, and to reduce the inherent 
instability of fluid milk prices by issuing uniform prices to all handlers (3). The tenet of 
classified pricing was that the price farmers receive should be based on handler use of the 
milk. Each dairy product was assigned to a "class", and the price paid by handlers for the 
milk was based on the amounts of milk used in each class. A necessary complement to 
classified pricing was a pooling of revenues from the sales of milk. This feature allowed 
either all producers delivering to a single handler or all producers belonging to the same 
21n this case, "surplus" milk was used to describe milk in excess of fluid needs. 
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cooperative to receive the same average or "blend" price. The pooling procedure 
acknowledged many of the concerns about equitable producer prices which were 
inadequately addressed by the other pricing plans. Classified pricing started around 1886 
in the Boston market and was steadily adopted in other city markets in the 1920s and 
1930s (3, 4). This approach to pricing milk was the most widely accepted and equitable 
among all pricing plans. 
The base rating plan was a combination of two milk pricing methods - the base 
excess plan and the classified pricing plan. The base for each producer was set equal to 
the average volume of milk marketed during the months in which milk supply was short. 
The base price was set to the average price for all milk sold in fluid form plus any lower 
class milk up to an amount equal to the volume of milk representing the combined bases 
of all cooperative members. Surplus milk received a price equal to the manufacturing milk 
price. The base rating plan also attempted to distribute returns for milk among producers 
as an incentive to develop more stable milk production patterns from month to month and 
year to year. 
Problems with Milk Pricing During and After World War I 
During World War I, cooperatives bargained for flat prices on all milk sold. They 
were successful in getting a favorable milk price because of the high demand for 
manufactured products in Europe. At the end of the war, demand for evaporated and 
condensed milk and other manufactured products diminished, and as a consequence of 
the disappearance of the manufactured milk market, processing plants closed all over the 
United States. Plants that continued to operate paid reduced prices for raw milk in order to 
survive. Producers and their bargaining cooperatives could not successfully force an 
increase in the price because the supply of milk far exceeded the demand for milk. 
The most fundamental difficulty in flat pricing was that distributors sold milk products 
that were valued both more and less than the price they paid for producer milk, and the 
proportion of milk sold in each use category varied greatly between distributors. 
Furthermore, distributors became dissatisfied with flat pricing as a means of purchasing milk 
from producer cooperatives. From a distributor's view point, there was too much milk in the 
flush and not enough during the short months. During the flush periods, milk was priced 
too high to dispose of it profitably, and flat pricing failed to recognize that a large part of the 
distributors' volume had a market value below the average on which the price was based 
(1 ). 
From a cooperative's view point, bargaining for flat pricing was met with several 
difficulties. If a cooperative bargained for a flat price that approximated the weighted 
average of fluid versus manufactured products, the distributor who utilized more milk for 
fluid was advantaged, and the distributor who used more milk for manufactured products 
was disadvantaged. Under flat pricing, the distributors selling a significant proportion of 
manufactured products tended to cut off producers in order to bring their milk receipts and 
fluid milk sales into closer adjustment (4). For example, a handler wanted to buy the 
minimum amount of milk necessary to cover his fluid milk sales system. Therefore, when 
production increased above what was needed for fluid milk sales, several strategies were 
used to reduce the supply of milk. Handlers often instructed dairy farmers to hold back one 
day's worth of milk, which was likely to be sold elsewhere at a lower price (4). Dealers were 
also known to send an insufficient number of cans to farms, and dairymen who did not 
have access to additional cans were forced to either use the milk on the farm or dump it. 
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Thus, for bargaining associations that did not operate manufacturing facilities, it was crucial 
to persuade dealers to buy the total available supply of milk at all times. 
Members of milk cooperatives met to discuss a strategy for proposing a widespread 
pricing plan to milk dealers, and classified pricing was recommended as the pricing plan of 
choice. Milk used for manufactured products which competed with similar products made 
outside the local fluid market was priced accordingly, which gave the cooperatives a freer 
hand in negotiating a price for milk sold for fluid purposes. The plan required dealers to 
reveal the exact use and sales of all milk products in order to determine the correct prices 
for each class of milk. Surprisingly, dealers accepted the proposal. However, when 
attempting to institute classified pricing, the cooperatives faced practical problems. For 
example, there were no means of assuring the accuracy of the dealers' reports of milk 
usage. Furthermore, extending classified pricing to non-members to prevent breakdown of 
the system from price cutting proved to be much more challenging than the cooperatives 
had anticipated. In spite of the logistical problems surrounding classified pricing, the plan 
saw extensive use in Boston, Washington, D.C., and Philadelphia around 1918 and 
increased to cover about 68 markets by 1933 (4). 
The Intervention of the Federal Government in Milk Markets 
Even before the Great Depression had its effects on milk prices, classified pricing 
plans were breaking down. Cooperatives did not have the power to audit the records of 
processors to determine the accuracy of milk usage reports. Underpayment by processors 
was widespread because the classified pricing plan lacked provisions for enforcement of 
the agreement between cooperatives and processors. Furthermore, cooperatives were not 
able to exercise monopoly control over milk producers and the milk supply, and thus, no 
credible threat of withholding milk could be made. Because classified pricing was never 
universally accepted, a processing firm could offer to buy milk from individual farmers for a 
price that was slightly above the cooperative blend price and limit purchases to an amount 
close to the firm's fluid milk sales (4, 5). 
The stock market crash in October, 1929 marked the beginning of the Great 
Depression and tougher times for dairy farmers. With the Great Depression came a severe 
drop in milk prices, resulting in a decrease in consumer purchasing power. In milk markets, 
instability was a predictable result of the failing economy. Producers who did not belong to 
cooperatives contributed to the increased instability by undercutting existing milk prices in 
an attempt to sell their product. On several occasions, producers who shipped milk to large 
markets attempted to force processors to increase prices by organizing milk strikes. 
Processors were able to obtain a sufficient supply of milk from producers who did not 
participate in the strike, and thus, the milk strikes typically proved to be largely ineffective. 
Dairymen, like most other farmers, began to turn to the government for reenforcement of 
their local efforts. Requests were made to state and federal governments for assistance in 
re-establishing more orderly market conditions in hopes of increasing and stabilizing milk 
prices (4, 5). 
Disorderliness, which refers to the lack of a predictable, sustainable, and efficient 
flow of a product to a specific market, ultimately led to the breakdown of dairy markets. If 
fluid milk markets were to have orderly supply, orderly production was required which further 
depended on orderly provisions for assembly and distribution. In addition, an orderly 
relationship between different markets in terms of price and supply was required. Without 
state or federal governmental intervention, there was little chance of creating orderly 
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marketing beyond the local level. The 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) sought to 
correct these failures in dairy markets by including provisions for milk and dairy products. 
The AAA attempted to improve prices and income to dairy farmers in two ways. 
First, milk and dairy products were designated as basic commodities, and as such they 
were offered the same price supports and production adjustment operations that existed 
for storable commodities. In spite of these allowances, the dairy industry did not support 
the proposal, and consequently, it was not adopted. The second set of measures that 
directly impacted the dairy industry was marketing agreements and Iicenses.3 With 
marketing agreements, milk dealers in a designated area were required to pay producers 
on a classified price basis and pool the returns to farmers either on a handler basis or a 
marketwide basis. In return, milk dealers were allowed to set minimum retail prices and 
minimum producer prices (8).4 Marketing agreements were voluntary for processors and 
handlers, and they were only popular in the largest cities, such as Boston, Baltimore, 
Knoxville, St. Louis and Chicago. Although marketing agreements were a well-conceived 
solution to the problems experienced in dairy markets, violations of agreements were 
widespread and were dealt with inadequately by the federal government. Dealers often 
misused their price-setting ability and set high retail prices without appropriately adjusting 
the minimum prices paid to producers. 
At the same time as the passage and institution of the AAA, the idea of "parity" 
was developed and used as a general goal for assisting farmers. Parity used the 1910 ­
1914 relationship between prices received and prices paid by farmers as a benchmark for 
establishing price and income goals. This specific time period was selected because of the 
favorable ratio of prices received by farmers relative to the prices paid. Though the 
immediate impact of the parity concept was minimal, parity was later used explicitly in 
setting support prices and loan rates for many agricultural commodities. 
During the middle 1930s, several Supreme Court rulings challenged the 
constitutionality of the 1933 AAA. Federal courts narrowly construed the passage of open­
ended laws, and if the AAA was challenged in court, it might have been declared 
unconstitutional because it lacked specific provisions for each section. Consequently, 
several amendments to the Act were passed by Congress in 1935. First, licenses were 
replaced with "orders" that were issued by the Secretary of Agriculture. Federal Milk 
Marketing Orders (FMMOs) provided the means for extending uniform opportunities and 
responsibilities to and enforcing them upon the entire designated market (7). Marketing 
orders corrected a major flaw in early collective bargaining approaches to regulation, Le., 
voluntary participation by processors and dealers. Second, class pricing and location price 
differentials were authorized within FMMOs along with market-wide pooling of revenues 
from milk sales. As an alternative to market-wide pooling, individual handler pooling was 
allowed upon approval by 75% of the producers in the order. Third, the 1935 Act 
authorized the use of funds for the expansion of markets and disposal of surplus 
agricultural products. Surplus products were to be purchased by the federal government 
and distributed for relief efforts. However, the impact on the dairy industry and overall milk 
3Marketing agreements were arrangements between the Secretary of Agriculture, producer 
associations, processors, and handlers that set prices and other terms of trade. Licenses regulated 
the conditions under which handlers could operate in a market. 
4The setting of retail prices by dealers was not well received by retailers and was abandoned by 
1934 as a matter of policy. 
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price structure was minimal because dairy product purchases amounted to less than 1% of 
total milk production. 
State and Federal Regulation in the 1930s 
The Federal government's authority to regulate interstate agricultural markets was 
interpreted with little latitude by courts in general, and federal government intervention in 
intrastate markets was ruled illegal by federal courts.s The ruling led to a proliferation of 
legislation for state regulation of milk markets. State sovereignty gave states clearcut 
authority to regulate intrastate milk markets directly so that federal devices were not 
needed. 
State regulation manifested itself in many shapes and forms. Most included some 
sort of resale price regulation, and others also restricted the entry of milk dealers into the 
industry through state licensing. Classified pricing was yet another issue that was 
addressed by most state laws. In 1932, Wisconsin passed the first state milk control law 
(8). The chief feature of the law was that it issued regulations specifying maximum and 
minimum retail prices in an attempt to prevent price undercutting by retailers. New York, 
Virginia, Maryland and other states soon followed with their own versions of milk pricing 
regulation. However, by 1941 most states that had previously legislated milk pricing 
regulations phased out state regulation altogether. A few states such as Georgia, Florida, 
Alabama, Montana, California, and Oregon enacted state regulation in the 1930s that 
lasted at least 30 years (8). Currently, only California maintains exclusive state-wide 
regulation of milk markets, though a handful of other states maintain regulations in specific 
regions within each state's boundaries. 
While federal regulation of intrastate milk markets was frowned upon by the federal 
courts, there was no doubt about the federal government's authority in interstate milk 
markets. In continuing with the intent of previous policy, the provisions for marketing 
agreements and orders established in the 1935 Act were basically restated and 
strengthened in the 1937 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA). One of the 
policies of the AMAA was "to establish and maintain such orderly marketing conditions for 
agricultural commodities in interstate commerce as would provide farmers with parity 
prices... ". However, USDA contended that the chief objective of the AMAA was to stabilize 
milk markets rather than to raise milk prices to artificially high levels. 
The AMAA provided a framework for long-term price and market stability. One 
fundamental difference between the AMAA and previous agricultural acts was the focus 
and intent of the legislation. With the AMAA, the approach to problems in milk marketing 
changed from dealing with the severe income difficulties resulting from the Depression to 
dealing with the inherent instability in milk markets. Specifically, the AMAA addressed the 
instability dilemma by instituting two policies. First, all handlers serving in an approved 
marketing area were brought under the scope of the regulatory mechanism. Second, all 
handlers were placed in the same competitive position with respect to a minimum price for 
milk for the same use. While this in and of itself would not eliminate instability caused by 
fundamental changes in supply and demand, it did tend to control the fluctuations caused 
by imperfect competition between buyers and sellers. Thus, although the two strategies 
Sintrastate milk markets must have the milkshed (area of milk production) and the markets (points 
of sales) within the state boundaries. 
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combined did not entirely erase the issue of instable fluid milk markets, the Act was 
instrumental in alleviating conditions of disorderly marketing. 
A Continuation of 1930s Policies During WWII and Throughout the 1940s 
The policies of the 1930s served to increase the farm price of milk and led to 
overproduction in many markets, gaining the attention of policy makers. Legislators 
attempted to set milk prices to bring supply and demand in each market into closer 
adjustment, but not all markets responded as anticipated to set prices. In some markets 
surpluses accumulated, making quick price adjustments impossible without seriously 
impacting the welfare of thousands of dairy farmers. 
The solution to the problem of localized surpluses was the United States' 
involvement in World War II. Excess supplies disappeared quickly in the face of increasing 
wartime demands, and the problem soon became one of inducing sufficient production to 
satisfy wartime needs for milk. The Steagall Amendment was one of many instruments 
devised to cope with the shortage of milk. The amendment set the support price at not 
less than 85 percent of parity for dairy products and other nonbasic commodities for which 
increased production was needed to satisfy the demands induced by WWII (12). 
Furthermore, open market purchases of butter by the government were instituted in 1941, 
marking the first widespread attempt to support the price of milk by purchasing 
manufactured dairy products (8).6 As another alternative to bolster milk supplies, 
government incentive payments were available to dairy farmers who were willing to increase 
milk production. 
In addition to increases in the cost of production and complications stemming from 
the United States' involvement in WWII, competition from manufacturing plants for limited 
milk supplies threatened to create a shortage of fluid milk. A formula pricing scheme for 
fluid (class I) milk was developed to induce dairy farmers and milk cooperatives to provide a 
sufficient supply of milk for beverage purposes. Under the formula pricing approach, fluid 
milk prices were set at a fixed amount above the price for milk used in manufacturing dairy 
products. The formula pricing of fluid milk was adopted in most FMMOs during WWII. 
Supply and demand adjusters were added later to vary the price actually paid from that 
determined through the use of the formula. The inclusion of the supply and demand 
adjusters was intended to reflect local market conditions, but they were limited in their 
usefulness as a result of difficulties encountered when incorporating them into pricing 
mechanisms. 
Government Intervention in Milk Markets After World War II 
The end of World War II brought about the demise of several temporary milk price 
enhancement mechanisms. However, the concept of governmental purchases of 
manufactured dairy products as a price support mechanism was retained and became the 
cornerstone of the dairy price support program, as specified by the Agricultural Act of 1949. 
Other features of the Act affecting the dairy industry were the ideas of a modern parity 
formula, so named because of the changes made to parity calculations, and a flexible price 
6Similar direct market purchases on a smaller scale occurred in the early 1920s and throughout 
the 1930s after the Commodity Credit Corporation was established. 
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support mechanism.7 The 1949 Act also gave the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) the 
authority to purchase manufactured dairy products, and the CCC continues to operate 
accordingly today. B 
Import Restrictions on Dairy Products 
In the absence of import restrictions, the dairy price support program would be 
burdened with the task of supporting world dairy prices because domestic prices for 
manufactured dairy products are generally higher than world market prices. Import controls 
are a necessary component of U.S. dairy policy. Even as early as 1933, legislators 
foresaw the potential impact on the dairy sector by allowing dairy products to flow into the 
United States unchecked. Hence, section 22 of the 1933 AAA included a list of general 
provisions under which the entry of foreign manufactured dairy products could be restricted 
to avoid such complications. The import restrictions allowed by section 22 were not applied 
until the implementation of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, two years after 
the institution of the dairy price support program. Imported products have typically been 
held to about 1 to 3 percent of total U.S. milk production. Products in direct competition 
with supported products are most tightly restricted while products that are not produced in 
the U.S. or produced in low quantities are less restricted. 
Dairy Policy in the 1960s 
Dairy policy in the 1960s was characterized by a growing awareness of market 
interrelationships, and improvements in transportation methods, roads, and trucks led to 
sweeping changes in the FMMO system. What was once considered a series of disparate 
and loosely linked marketing orders was increasingly viewed an integrated system. Two 
key features that developed in the 1960s that contributed to uniting the FMMOs was the 
Minnesota-Wisconsin (M-W) price and a class pricing system that used the M-W price as 
the basic formula price (BFP).9 Over a decade elapsed before all FMMOs accepted and 
totally converted to the M-W system, but once they adopted the M-W system, class prices 
were determined by adding differentials of various magnitude to the M-W price. Milk used 
7"Flexible" refers to the discretionary power of the Secretary of Agriculture to set the minimum 
support price within a range of 75 to 90 percent of parity. 
&rhe government-owned Commodity Credit Corporation carries out price support activities for 
many agricultural commodities. To support milk prices, the CCC offers to buy butter, nonfat dry milk, 
and cheddar cheese at prices calculated to return at least the support price, on the average, to 
manufacturing grade milk. Because the support price is a goal price established by the federal 
government and not a "real" price, dairy farmers may receive prices that are either above or below 
the support price. The CCC purchasing mechanism indirectly establishes a price floor for milk used 
for manufacturing dairy products which, in turn, indirectly supports the price for all milk. 
9The M-W price is determined by a survey of grade B milk processing plants in Minnesota and 
Wisconsin. It is a market pay price for manufacturing grade milk resulting from competition among 
the grade B plants. The survey is administered by each states' agricultural statistics service, and the 
results of the survey are forwarded to the National Agricultural Statistics Service which determines the 
final M-W price. 
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in products with an intrinsically higher value received larger differentials, e.g. the class I 
price for milk used in beverage milk products was higher than the class price for the 
identical volume of milk used to produce ice cream or butter. By using the M-W price as 
the basic mover of grade A milk prices in FMMOs, price changes were reflected 
simultaneously in all order areas. With the acceptance of the M-W came the demise of the 
supply and demand adjusters that were developed after WWII. 
A second important advancement during the 1960s was the recognition of a 
rationale for determining class I prices. In a series of studies which aspired to explain the 
existing pattern of fluid milk prices across the country, researchers hypothesized that the 
relationship between fluid market I prices depended on two factors - distance from the 
Upper Midwest and transportation costs (10). To verify the supposition, a base point in Eau 
Claire, WI was selected to represent the center of the area of greatest surplus grade A milk 
production, and market prices (not federal order prices) were estimated relative to distance 
from Eau Claire. The hypothesis concerning market prices proved to be valid, and 
transportation based pricing using Eau Claire as the base point has since evolved into the 
primary explanation for the regulated geographic structure of class I prices. It became 
accepted practice to set class I prices in other cities by adding a fixed differential to the Eau 
Claire class I price which generally reflected costs of transportation with some allowance for 
local supply and demand conditions (10). This approach to milk pricing served to align 
class I prices in FMMOs east of the Rocky Mountains. 
Dairy Policy in the 1970s and 1980s 
The theme of the early 1970s was to get government out of agricUlture, as 
advocated by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz. However, despite the ambitious effort to 
separate government from agriculture, the focus of the late 1970s through the early 1980s 
was to reestablish more aggressive support of dairy farmers. Consequently, policy makers 
started to see the results of past legislation in the form of increased dairy product surpluses 
and increased government expenditures as early as 1977. 
Starting in late 1972, several factors converged to create a domestic shortage of 
dairy products. With milk supplies lagging behind projected levels and commercial 
disappearance of dairy products remai ning unchanged, milk prices increased as expected. 
However, President Richard Nixon was determined to control both wages and rising prices, 
and when milk prices increased by 30 percent in the span of a few months in late 1973, 
President Nixon attempted to carry out his decree by temporarily suspending a select group 
of import quotas. Furthermore, to take political advantage of the market price increases, 
support prices for milk were increased concurrently. 
Revisions in dairy policy and price support in creases came about with the passage 
of the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973. As mandated by previous acts, 
the new legislation called for milk prices to be established at levels that would "...assure a 
sufficient quantity of pure and wholesome milk to meet current consumption needs." The 
1973 Act also addressed the issue of depressed farm income levels, an added twist not 
seen in earlier legislation. Specifically, the 1973 Act sought to assure a level of farm 
income "...adequate to maintain productive capacity sufficient to meet anticipated future 
needs." Furthermore, the Act noted that a price structure which recognized the sum total 
of forces affecting the national supply and demand for fluid and manufacturing grade milk 
was necessary if milk prices were to be set equitably. No other Act in history attempted to 
account for as many factors in determining the right price for milk. For example, the total 
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supply of milk was shown to depend on the prices received, costs of production, alternative 
income producing alternatives on and off the farm, and future expectations of milk price. 
Demand for milk and other dairy products, on the other hand, depended on retail prices, 
consumer income, changes in demographics, availability of substitutes, and advertising. 
Despite the encouragement from farmers to boost milk prices, legislators acted 
conservatively and set parity at 80 percent. It was generally agreed that the increase in 
parity level was trivial as a result of the high prevailing M-W price at the time the Act was 
passed. 
Eventually, domestic milk prices dropped as a result of the relaxation of the import 
quotas, which led to a "collision" between the market price for milk and the mandated 
increase in support prices. Dairy farmers, seeing the sudden drop in the price of milk, felt 
that the times of favorable milk prices were slipping away, and strongly requested 
assistance from Congress and the new president. 
When President Carter entered the office of the presidency in 1976, he came with 
the promise for higher milk prices. In his first year, he used his authority to set the support 
price at a level in excess of 80 percent of parity. Congress used the Food and Agriculture 
Act of 1977 as the legislative vehicle for maintaining higher prices for dairy farmers. The 
1977 Act set the support price at 80 percent of parity and also required that it be adjusted 
semi-annually to reflect changes in prices paid by farmers for input supplies, known as the 
Prices Paid Index. These provisions were authorized for two years, but because the price 
support provisions seemed to function as planned, Le., the support price seemed to follow 
the Prices Paid Index, they were extended for another two years in 1979. Policy makers 
did not recognize that market forces were bringing milk supplies into adjustment with 
demand and that the support price increases promised during President Carter's campaign 
did not coincide with the prevailing conditions. 
In the four years following the passage of the 1977 Food and Agriculture Act, the 
support price for grade A milk rose to $13.10 per hundredweight, and annual net 
governmental expenditures on the dairy sector increased to nearly $2 billion. Faced with 
staggering expenditures on dairy products and no end in sight, the federal government and 
Congress were forced to act on one of two alternatives - either reduce the support price to 
stop encouraging milk production or continue to support dairy farmers but reduce the 
production surplus by some other means. A fierce political battle ensued to determine 
which alternative, if either, would be best suited to achieve a reduction in governmental 
expenditures. Reducing the support price was eventually chosen as the means for 
reducing the surplus of milk and dairy products. Nonetheless, legislators soon realized that 
cutting the support price was nearly impossible because of political inertia, and therefore, 
they opted for the less difficult and controversial decision of freezing the support price. 
Consequently, by legislative act, the last scheduled price increase for the 1980 - 1981 time 
frame as outlined in the 1979 Act was rescinded, and the support price became frozen at 
$13.10 per hundredweight. Recognizing that something had to be done in the 1981 farm 
bill, Congress not only eliminated semi-annual adjustments, it also temporarily severed the 
tie to parity. Under the 1981 Agriculture and Food Act, minimum support prices were 
legislatively set at incrementally increasing levels for the years 1982 through 1985 in dollars 
per hundredweight. 
By the end of 1981, milk production was still increasing and net removals remained 
high. Legislators concerned only with the federal budget and the mounting deficit stepped 
into the picture with the intent of reducing governmental expenditures on dairy products. 
Not satisfied with the immediate impact on the budget, Congress introduced the 1982 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act which authorized a means for dairymen to help fund 
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the dairy price support program. A $0.50 assessment was placed on every hundredweight 
of milk marketed with the first collection of the assessment schedule for April, 1983. 
Furthermore, the bill also allowed for an additional but refundable $0.50 deduction per 
hundredweight implemented in September, 1983. The deduction was refundable to 
producers who reduced marketings by an amount specified by the Secretary of Agriculture. 
The assessments and deductions proved to be effective instruments for generating 
revenue to assist in the funding of the dairy price sup port program; from October 1, 1983 to 
September 30, 1984 over $800 million was collected from dairy farmers. However, the 
assessments were extremely unpopular with farmers and did little to curb total milk 
production, forcing legislators to seek other means of reducing milk production. 
The 1983 Dairy Production Stabilization Act marked the first attempt by the federal 
government to control the supply of milk. The Act featured the Milk Diversion Program 
(MOP), devised to encourage dairy producers to reduce the amount of milk marketed. 
Under the MOP, direct payments of $10.00 per hundredweight were offered to dairy 
farmers who reduced marketings by a percentage of a historical base. The decrease in the 
amount of milk marketed was in the range of 5 to 30 percent. The MOP operated from 
January 1984 to March 1985, and about 38,000 or 20 percent of commercial dairy 
producers participated (2, 11). Marketings for 1984 and the first quarter of 1985 were 
reduced by approximately 9.4 billion pounds. However, it was estimated that 2.2 billion 
pounds of the volume reduced was "air", that is, some producers had already reduced their 
level of production relative to the base prior to the contract period (2, 11). Nonparticipants 
also increased their production during the time that the program was operational so that 
total reductions were somewhat less than the 7.4 million pounds of milk actually diverted. 
Participants received a total of $955 million in payments for the reduced production levels 
(12). At the conclusion of the MOP, it became clear that the MOP did not solve any 
problems; it had only delayed the time in which the problem manifested itself. Program 
participants, who were no longer under any obligation to reduce milk production, restored 
cows to their herds. This resulted in a surge in national milk production to record levels, 
triggering the eee purchasing mechanism in an attempt to maintain the mandated level of 
price support. 
Another highlight from the Act included the authorization of a National Dai ry 
Promotion and Research Board. The National Dairy Board (NOB) is responsible for 
promotion and advertisement of any dairy products, nutritional education, and related 
research, and it is funded by a nonrefundable assessment of $0.15 per hundredweight on 
milk marketed (9, 12). Although the National Dairy Board was authorized in December 
1983, it was not constituted until the middle of 1984, which meant that there was no 
immediate impact on altering demand for dairy products through promotion and 
advertising. Producers initially viewed the NOB favorably, but it was soon criticized by some 
producers because of the mandatory assessments and perceived ineffectiveness in 
boosting demand for dairy products. 
In continuing with the policy of reducing governmental expenditures on surplus dairy 
products, the Dairy Production Stabilization Act also included provisions for price support 
adjustments and assessments. The support price was reduced to $12.60 on December 1, 
1983, and was reduced further on April 1, 1985 and July 1, 1985 because net removals 
were expected to exceed preset levels. 10 A $0.50 per hundredweight nonrefundable 
1O'fhe United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) was authorized to decrease the support 
price on April 1, 1985 to $12.10 if net removals were expected to exceed six billion pounds on a milk 
equivalent, fat-solids basis (M.E.) from April 1, 1985 to March 30, 1986. Furthermore, the USDA was 
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deduction, like that conceived by the 1982 Budget Reconciliation Act, was also approved 
through March, 1985. With the expectation of a new farm bill, most provisions were slated 
to end at some point during 1985. 
The Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA) brought about several changes in dairy policy, 
and it included provisions for modifying class I differentials, a whole herd buyout program, 
and a program to assist in exporting dairy products. In what would later be viewed as a 
landmark maneuver, Congress legislated specific pricing in FMMOs by increasing the class 
I differentials. The change in the differentials, however, was not nearly as sensitive an 
issue as the manner in which they were modified, Le., the differentials were not increased 
uniformly across all orders. For example, the class I differential increased by 8¢ per 
hundredweight in the Upper Midwest, but increased by $1.03 per hundredweight in 
Southeast Florida. Producers in the Upper Midwest perceived the changes as 
discriminatory and would later advance the concept of eliminating class I differentials 
altogether. 
The FSA authorized the Dairy Termination Program (DTP), marking the second 
major attempt to initiate some form of supply control in the dairy industry. The idea behind 
the DTP was to buyout an entire dairy herd and obtain a commitment from the 
participating farmers not to partake in dairying for the next five years. Cows and heifers 
that were purchased from farmers exiting the dairy farming business were required to be 
exported or slaughtered. The buyout program was voluntary; interested parties submitted 
sealed bids for the minimum price per hundredweight for which they would be willing to 
comply with the regulations. A total of 12 billion pounds of milk was targeted for removal 
from the market. The DTP accepted about 14,000 bids of the 39,534 bids submitted (6). 
The national cutoff point for acceptable bids was $22.50, and over the 18-month span 
which marked the operation of the DTP (April, 1986 through September, 1987), the total 
cost in payments to farmers was $1.827 billion (6). Participation in the DTP was not 
uniform throughout the country. California accounted for the largest portion of the 12.28 
billion pounds purchased, but the percentage of farmers participating was not exceptionally 
hlgh in any particular state (6). Farmers from southeastern states had a disproportionately 
larger application and acceptance rate than farmers from other regions of the country; the 
states of Wisconsin, New York, Pennsylvania, and Nevada had the lowest participation 
rates. 
The Dairy Export Incentive Program was also devised to reduce surplus dairy 
products. The program was designed to assist U.S. exporters of dairy products in entering 
foreign markets. The CCC was authorized to accept or reject bids for export subsidies from 
any qualified exporter of dairy products. These payments were given to offset some of the 
costs involved in selling the higher priced U.S. dairy products in the lower priced world 
market. Payments were originally made via certificates redeemable in commodities held by 
the CCC, but this policy was later changed to a direct cash subsidy. Although still in 
existence, the DEIP represents only a modest effort to increase U.S. exports of dairy 
products. 
The FSA specified changes in the support price as well. For the calendar year of 
1986, the support price was dropped to $11.60 per hundredweight. Further reductions 
dropped the support price to $11.35 per hundredweight for January through September of 
empowered to decrease the support price by an additional $0.50 per hundredweight on July 1, 1985 
if projected net removals exceeded five billion pounds, M.E. from July 1, 1985 to June 30, 1986 (9). 
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1987, after which the support price dropped to $11.10 per hundredweight for the remainder 
of the year. Moreover, triggered price cuts were approved for the next three years. 11 
However, drought conditions in 1989 brought about emergency relief amendments to the 
1985 FSA scheduled support price reductions. On April 1, 1989, the support price 
increased by $0.50 per hundredweight followed by a $0.50 per hundredweight reduction on 
July 1, 1989, bringing the price support to $10.60 per hundredweight. On January 1, 1990 
the last of the triggered price cuts went into effect, dropping the price support to $10.10 per 
hundredweight where it has remained ever since. 
The 1990 Food. Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act 
The dominant dairy policy theme of the 1970s and 1980s was that of price supports. 
In particular, the legislation that emerged in the 1980s was intended to address problems 
that resulted from well-intended but ultimately-disastrous strategies in the 1970s. In 
contrast, the approach to dairy policy that is developing in the 1990s moves away from the 
issue of price supports and toward topics that concern FMMOs and international trade. 
The Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990 (FACTA) emerged as 
the first piece of legislation to impact the dairy industry in the 1990s. The FACTA did little 
more than complete the trend that started in the 1980s by establishing a schedule of 
support price changes related to surpluses and a price floor of $10.10 per hundredweight. 
The Act also contained a controversial and fiercely contested provision-Section 102, 
entitled Milk Manufacturing Margin Adjustment. This provision attempts to prevent states 
which still have milk pricing authority from setting prices for milk used in manufacturing less 
than that which pertains to federal orders. Growing discontent with the M-W price series 
among both processors and producers prompted legislators to address the issue of 
devising a new BFP. In 1992, USDA held a hearing to accept proposals for alternatives to 
the M-W price as authorized by Section 103 of FACTA. In August, 1994, a recommended 
decision was issued by USDA for a new BFP, and barring an unexpected defeat of the 
proposal, the new BFP will be effective in early 1995. 
Conclusion 
A review of U. S. dairy policy from the early 1900s through the 1980s reveals the 
"chameleon" nature of governmental intervention in dairy markets. In its infancy, dairy 
policy attempted to stabilize dairy markets and bolster prices to help ailing dairy farmers, 
but more recently, dairy policy has been viewed as a tool to help curb excess production as 
milk supply outstrips demand for dairy products. Policy makers have been more inclined to 
modify the original Congressional acts to address the needs of dairy farmers rather than 
completely overhaul the legislation, and therefore, dairy policy enacted in the 1930s 
remains largely intact today. However, the large dairy surplus duri ng the 1970s and 1980s 
suggests that regulations have not always been appropriately designed or administered to 
benefit producers and consumers alike. 
110n January 1 of 1988, 1989, and 1990 the support price was to be reduced by $0.50 per 
hundredweight if net removals exceeded 5 billion pounds ME, and if net removals were less than 2.5 
billion pounds ME, the support price was to increase by $0.50 per hundredweight. 
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The 1990s brings yet another look at dairy policy in the face of an emerging global 
economy and increasing concerns over the federal deficit. Among the topics in dairy policy 
receiving the most attention are class pricing and international trade. Specifically, by 1995, 
new methods for determining the BFP and class II prices will be in place, and a fourth class 
established to price milk used in the production of nonfat dry milk will be celebrating its 
second anniversary. In addition, the recent Congressional approval of two international 
trade agreements, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has given dairy policy an unprecedented 
international flavor. 
The change from a Democratic to a Republican Congress in 1995 adds another 
dimension to the equation for change in dairy policy. The expiration of the FACTA at the 
end of 1995 and the Repulicans' promulgation of their agenda to reduce government's role 
in economic and social policies has left people involved in agriculture to speculate how the 
change in Congress will effect the new farm bill. Considerable changes are probable. Major 
modifications are not made easily, but the difficulty of implementing sweeping changes 
must be viewed in light of the Republicans' perception of what most citizens want, Le., 
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